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1
It is constantly stated that the world has changed in some fundamental fashion because of the events of
11 September.  That this is a generally unsupported contention does little to mitigate the effect of the
discourse.  On the contrary, the continued articulation of the argument reconstitutes the world we live in,
and thus, serves to bring about the change that supposedly occurred with the terrorist attacks.  It is my
intention, in writing this paper, to put forth that the ‘common sense’ arguments that have emerged to
support the homeland defence initiative within the United States, and the apparent move by Canada to
support this drive, are not contingent on 11 September, and that the logic underpinning Canadian
participation is not reducible to economic or military ‘facts.’  In order to illustrate the manner in which
the discourse of homeland defence has emerged, this paper will argue three main points: that the
territoriality of the state has not been fading; that globalization is not about de-territorialization; and that
homeland defence, which was alive and well before 11 September, has only been accelerated, not altered
in any profound way.  These three points will allow me to assert that the Canadian desire to join into
homeland defence has nothing to do with making Canadian society more safe or to protect its economy,
but is rather about a need to be inside the ‘democratic’ house which is clearly delineated and ascribed by
the homeland perimeter.
The topic of territoriality has been the subject of a significant amount of research, rooted
primarily within political geography, but has found more recent expression within critical approaches to
international relations.1  This literature has attempted to come to terms with the manner in which the
territorialized state is constructed, and the manner in which that construction in turn affects international
politics.  “Human societies create territory out of meaningless space… A given territory is, by definition,
separate from the territories of others, not only physically but, by and large, also ideologically…”2  For
the most part, authors working on this subject have rejected the manner in which the state has been
superimposed on to a geographic space, recognizing that the connection emerged within, and is thus
inseparable from a West European political context.  While territoriality has been studied from a number
of different perspectives, the approaches that this paper will draw upon deal broadly with the issue of the
discursive creation of the territorialized state.
By stating that the territorialized state is a discursive creation the argument that territoriality is
historically contextualized and lacking in any objective grounding is being put forward .  Furthermore, as
a discourse that is meant to capture ‘reality’ it is constantly being exposed as inadequate to the task of
containing all meaning; meanings that are ascribed to terrritoriality are unstable and require constant
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rearticulation.3  This is not to say that the discourse can contain any meaning, a degree of continuity with
previous conceptions of the term is expected.  In particular John Ruggie has traced the development of
territoriality in governance, a process which he argues was not functionally determined.  “The modern
mode of differentiation resulted from changes in several domains of social life, which are irreducible to
one another.”4  Territoriality is not “natural” in any meaningful manner.  In spite of the way in which
physical geography obviously exists, our understanding of this physical space is entirely ascribed.  This
ascription is neither perfect nor permanent; societies do change the manner in which they relate to
geography.  However, these changes are generally slow processes which contain echoes of past
articulations.  Following on the language that has developed in post-structural approaches, there is a
constant process of both de/territorialization and re/territorialization that takes place.5  
The construction of the meanings of communities and their boundaries occurs through
narratives: ‘stories’ that provide people with common experiences, history and memories, and
thereby bind these people together.  Narratives should not be comprehended only as modes of
representation but also as discourses that crucially shape social practice and life.6 
According to Mathias Albert “For territory to be meaningful it has to be reproduced by the
enactment of challenges to it, by questionings and erasures of boundaries as markers of space, but also
through the inscription of new boundaries.”  Given the centrality of security and identity to territoriality,
any assault on either is bound to lead to a reformation of our conception of territoriality.  However, what
is of interest is the degree to which any particular challenge is likely to result in a significant shift in the
understanding of territoriality.   It is unlikely that a security threat will result in a re-articulation of
territoriality that differs substantially from previous understandings.
The modern territorialized state is the heir of the Westphalian state, which is a sovereign political
entity that is geographically delineated.7  The sovereign entity becomes the primary referent for security;
it is the state and its sovereignty that must be defended.  This is the understanding of security that is
prevalent in neo/realist approaches to international relations.  However, the reductionist expression of the
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Westphalian state can no longer be passed off as representative of today’s states.  Any approach that
relies on such a simple articulation is incapable of providing an adequate understanding of the
complexity of the current Western connection between state, society, and territory.8  In order to
understand the modern territorialized state it is essential that we recognize that the notions of citizenship
and nationalism have been grafted onto the state, and that these concepts are now often treated as
inseparable.  The result of this union is that the geographic boundaries of the nation and state are
expected to coincide, the result of which is that the territorialized state has a much larger significance
than demarcating the boundaries of sovereignty.  As will be demonstrated the territorialized state is
central to the interconnected notions of security and identity.  On the one hand the territorial state is
constructed as the primary referent of security, of a body that must be protected from harm.  At the same
time the state also denotes the limits of social identity, demarking who does and does not belong to a
particular community.  While this paper will proceed by examining these two concepts separately, they
are largely co-determinous; each relying on the other.   
Territorialization and Security
Territoriality continues to be the dominant context within which security is conceptualized.  While there
have been attempts to broaden the referents of security, the geographically bounded state continues to be
the central object of analysis.  The work of Barry Buzan is explicit in the manner in which, in spite of a
move to increase the breadth of security, the state remains at the centre of analysis.9  His argument rests
in large part on the assumption of sovereignty; that the state is the sole body permitted to wield military
force.  As this simple “fact” continues to describe the ordering of force within the world today, there is a
certain elegance in Buzan’s movement to recognize the contingent nature of social organization while
dealing with it as a sedimented reality.  However, such an approach ultimately reinforces those
categories and does little to expose opportunities for change.
Much of the confusion that emerges with any discussion of the state comes from a drive to
essentialize the concept.  The difficulty is that the idea of the state is multi-faceted and irreducible to a
single phenomenon.  The state is not just a form of political organization but is today a geographically
delineated entity.  The state as a referent of security is then more than the ruling elite, or just the people,
it incorporates the soil, water, and air of a country.  Political governance, security referent, and identity
source are all delineated with the same geographic boundary.  Due to this geographic groundedness of
the state, and thus the relations between states, geography continues to be relevant to the study of
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international relations.  The problem is that this connection between geography and state has, in the past,
been treated as natural and inevitable.
While the Darwinist inspired naturalist approach to the study of geopolitics of Ratzel and
Mackinder has thankfully receded to a footnote, the articulation of a “body” politic continues within
public discourse.10  The United States, for example, is not just a political arrangement or a community of
peoples, it can only make sense by considering the country as a geographic space that corresponds with
the governance of the state.  An attack on the territory of a state is considered an attack on the political
community, and must therefore, be prevented.  In this manner geopolitics, the study of the relation
between geography and political communities, remains important.  Gerard Ó’Tuathail makes a
compelling case for the continued examination of geopolitics, though from a more inclusive perspective. 
“...[M]odern geopolitics can be thought of as a regime of power/knowledge that produced international
politics as an objective global spatial drama, a ceaseless global struggle between predetermined
geographical entities, and as a vision of territorial states dominating global space.”11  Because geography
continues to matter to politics, — domestic and international — geography must continue to be
considered in international political behaviour.
The fields of international relations and security studies generally take the territorialized state for
granted, abandoning the analysis of politics within the state, focusing rather on cross-border, inter-state
relations.  The realist billiard ball models treats states as geographically discreet entities that interact
across borders.  However, this model only makes sense when the notion of the balls are constrained by a
fixed billiards table, without a set geographic space states could conceivably act at will without ever
bumping up against others.  The idea of states operating in a fixed geographic space is then central to this
model.
The manner in which militaries are oriented and the strategies and tactics which dictate their use
are also tied into the same territorialized reasoning.  The role of modern militaries is largely about the
need to control space, which is evidenced in their doctrine.12  In short, geography has underpinned
modern thinking about the roles of militaries.  Prior to the Cold War the territorialized state was
primarily vulnerable to other states at its borders.  The role of militaries (the control of space including
land, sea, and air) informed the perceived threats to states, and was in turn a response to the perceived
threat.  Armies were designed to penetrate a country, to seize the control of land, and to exert control
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over territory.13  This in turn dictated the response to other militaries and predetermined military/strategic
thinking.
The re/territorialization of the security of the state does not end with the orientation of a state’s
armed forces.  We can in fact see a concomitant move to territorialize threats to the state.  In effect as the
geographically bounded state is the object of reference, when a threat to the state is perceived, it in turn
becomes territorialized.  In part this may emerge from the need of militaries to treat the world in
geographic terms.  However, more importantly this territorialization of security is dependent on the
manner in which territory is central to our understanding of what is to be defended.  Because our
understanding of international relations relies on territoriality it is difficult to remove ourselves from the
assumptions that are built into our understandings of war and conflict.  This becomes particularly acute
once the language of War is used.  States go to war with other states, or with portions of society that are
seeking their own country (civil war).  In both cases the forces are broken down into geographic entities,
reproduced in the multitude of maps used in media broadcasts to show where the enemy lies.  The
current response to terror has followed this model, with states seeking to link terrorists to geographic
entities, striving to show a connection between foreign states and terror.  Recent history is replete with
examples of punishing states for terrorist activities.  The most obvious example is the current war in
Afghanistan in order to prevent further terrorist attacks.  This is in spite of the obvious global links of Al
Qaeda, and the substantial evidence that the organization is able to operate within liberal states such as
United States, Canada, and Germany.  The territorialized discourse of security forces a response against
another territorialized actor, thus Afghanistan stands in as a surrogate for the terrorists.  Territoriality
remains crucial to the understanding of security within the West.
Territorialization and Identity
Identity must be considered in a discussion of security as it determines who is to be protected from
whom.  Furthermore, it delineates who within a state may constitute a threat, thus who essentially is
scripted as being external to a particular identity.  The concept of identity is easily one of the most
complex terms used in political studies, and unsurprisingly is approached from a broad range of
theoretical positions.  At the core of its usage is a sense that identity signifies the essence of an object; it
attempts to fix an object’s meaning.  Obviously the complexity increases dramatically when it is applied
to the analysis of people and societies.  With respect to social meaning, identity is how people feel they
relate to their physical and social environment, defining how a person is to relate to ‘others.’  This paper
takes the position that these identities are inherently groundless, and as social constructions require
constant re/articulation.  Any identity can be revealed to be a simplification will inevitably be shown to
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be contradictory due to the elimination of complexity.  Crucial to this understanding of identity is to
recognise that at its core identities must be constructed around the relationship between the Self and
Other.  David Campbell describes this as a relationship between identity and difference, and as one of
“inside/outside.”  Identities are then necessarily constructed in opposition to a constructed other a person
or people that is alien and foreign.
As we have seen, the discourse of security is reliant on territoriality; the second significant
aspect of ‘territory’ is the manner in which it has become a central context for identity creation.  Identity,
as it has been linked to the development of the territorial state, itself became dependent on territory.  The
‘place’ from which a person emerged became a key marker in defining ‘who’ that person or was. 
According to Lothar Brock “territorial demarcations and control are the prime differentiating and
organizing principles of the Westphalian system of states, and … territorialisation is a central mode of
coding social practice…”14  This seems to be largely taken for granted in current conversation.  The
geographic boundaries are used as one of the main markers to signify who is and who is not a part of a
given society.  The boundaries are expected to separate groups, effectively separating ‘inside’ and
‘outside,’ the ‘civilized’ from ‘uncivilized,’ ‘US’ from ‘them.’15
The modern nation-state is premised on the notion that its geographic boundaries delineates
belonging, which then defines a state’s identity.  The role of the discourse of territory in identity
formation goes beyond the simple indication of where a person may claim citizenship.  The geography of
the state is linked to identity in a much deeper way, it is organically part of what it is to belong to a
particular state.  To be Canadian is to be connected with a particular geography which is constantly
reproduced in discourses of visual arts, music, and literature, all of which contribute to the notion that to
be Canadian is to be in some way connected with the Canadian geography.  “Because territory forms a
part of the state identity and a part of the identity of many human groups, it is valued independently of its
strategic or economic benefits.”16  While national identity is not entirely constituted by geography,
certainly territory plays a central role.
The centrality of geography in identity is in many respects inevitable given the interest of the
state apparatus in perpetuating and re/inventing an identity where the state itself is territorially bounded. 
Roxanne Doty is clear in showing how boundaries are central to the nation-state. 
...the inside/outside boundary is a function of a state’s discursive authority, that is, its ability, in
the face of ambiguity and uncertainty, to impose fixed and stable meanings about who belongs
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and who does not belong to the nation, and thereby to distinguish a specific political community
S the inside S from all others S the outside.17
Thus, as with our discussion with security and territoriality, when the physical body of the state
is attacked, our very identity is assaulted.  In essence an attack on the soil of a country is an attack on the
people.  This was seen in the manner in which the United States reacted to the horrific attacks on the
American embassies in East Africa on 8 August 1998.  According to international law, embassies are to
be treated as the sovereign territory of the embassy’s state, however, this convention does not have
popular resonance.  The attack on the embassy in Mozambique was not viewed as an attack on American
soil, therefore, though it was horrible, the event did not result in a similar public emotional response as
the attack on the World Trade Center.  While both cases resulted in massive loss of life, only one was an
attack on American soil, and thus only one was an attack on the American people.
Identity formation is clearly not a fixed process, it is continuously confronted by alternative
identity formations and is constantly exposed in its arbitrariness.  “Constructing the identity of a people
is a continual and never-completed project, but it cannot appear as such.  In other words, the people must
simultaneously be presumed as given and at the same time be continually reproduced.”18  The
territorialized identity of the state is no different from any other identity formation.  However, the state,
with far more resources at its disposal is much more effective in perpetuating identity formations. 
Furthermore, as David Campbell illustrated through his discussion of the centrality of danger to the
state’s identity, any evidence of danger reinforces state identity.
The nexus between identity and security is seen most clearly in responses to attacks on a state. 
11 September could have been seen as evidence that territoriality has lost its relevance.  However, the
attack on the World Trade Centre was written as an attack on Americans, it was validation that there was
a violent external other lurking outside of the state.  This in turn re/vitalized territorial identity which fed
into the re/territorialization of the state’s security discourse.  The other was outside of the state in terms
of both territory and identity, and had to be denied entry to America.  
Globalization and Deterritorialization
This paper has so far presented territorialtiy as if it was an uncontested concept, and that there is a
general acceptance that we live in a world within which geography is a significant, if not the most
important, form of security and identity delineation.  In fact, since the early 1990s the centrality of
territorialization has been a hotly debated topic.  There is a great deal of literature cross-cutting
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theoretical perspectives which point to the deterritorialization of the state.19  This literature generally
argues that territory is losing its relevance as an identity and security marker, and that other referents are
emerging that are replacing the territorialized state.   In particular, the processes of globalization are seen
as undermining the state system of organization and identity.  Anderson and O’Dowd, recognizing that
there are different understandings of globalization, categorize them into two general categories of strong
and weak globalization.  The strong globalization group, represented by Ohmae, Castells, Giddens,
Fukayama, and O’Brien, generally emphasize economics and technology over culture.  They see an
imminent demise of the relevance of the territorial state as a central marker of identity.  On the other
hand, Hirst, Thompson, and Mann all argue that weak globalization has not led to the significant eclipse
of the state.   “Weak globalization perspectives point, implicitly or explicitly, to the adaptability of state
territoriality as new macro-regional borders develop around (and within) the EU, NAFTA, and looser,
weaker associations such as Mercosur....”20  This second grouping focuses on regionalization as a gradual
changing of the territorial state.
This paper will pursue the critique of territoriality that is found within the strong globalization
school.  The manner in which globalization impacts on territoriality is explicitly laid out by Paasi:
It is now increasingly being argued that capitalism and the processes of globalisation will give
rise to new global geographies and increase all manner of links (cultural, political, economic,
informational) across boundaries.  This will detract from the role of state boundaries and
sovereignty and lead to the de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of the territorial system.21
The causes of this deterritorialization have been well documented, and confront us on a daily
basis.  Increases in cross-border traffic, the growth of a supposed transnational managerial class, the
internet and the liberalization of trade, are all supposed to be undermining the state system; a process that
some see as leading to a new global civil society which has little or no territorial grounding.  New
patterns of social relations are argued to be emerging which provide an alternative to geographically
based identity.  The ability of mass media to propagate cultures across geographic divides is supposed to
be signaling the demise of territorially based identities.
Just as globalization is altering identities, it is also supposed to be leading to a deterritorialization
of security threats.  The growth of non-territorially based identities is related to a move to non-territorial
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based conceptions of security.  The internet as a source and target for security concerns, and the
environment, are both examples of deterritorialized security issues.  As states become less territorially
grounded, and identity loses its geographic boundedness, then territorialized security must be expected to
further erode.  Furthermore, the referents of security can be seen as being either sub-state or trans-state in
nature.  Ó Tuathail does an excellent job of showing how security has become deterritorialized,
providing a long list of examples of non-territorialized threats.  At the same time he acknowledges that
militaries continue to have to “negotiate territory and place.”22  Whether the referents are Multi-National
Corporations (MNCs) or various sub-altern groupings, the state is supposed to have lost much of its
relevance.  Threats such as terrorism and environmental degradation are described as no longer being
rooted within geographic borders.  They target phenomenon that are not geographically constrained such
as the internet and transnational capital. Security is then seen as no longer being a territorial phenomenon
— as being uprooted from its previous grounding.  
The arguments supporting the deterritorialization of security and identity have been over-stated. 
In order to demonstrate that territoriality is losing its relevance it is essential to be able to empirically
demonstrate two related phenomenon.  First, it must be shown that the territorialized state is losing its
relevance as a security referent in public discourse; that it is no longer the state that is being defended. 
Secondly, it must be illustrated that there is a move to alternate levels of identity formation which are
incompatible with, and have eclipsed the state.  If these two points can be empirically validated then we
can accept that deterritorialization of the state has occurred and that any re/territorialization that may
have occurred has been limited.  However, while globalization has been happening, its impact on the
geographic rooting of identity and security has been quite limited.  
In discussing the impact of globalization on issues of identity and security, there is a tendency to
exaggerate and confuse the situation, and to assert that it is more universal than evidence would support. 
Even if it is accepted that changing trade patterns may have an influence on identity formations, the
dramatic change that has been the basis of the strong globalization school must be demonstrated.  In fact,
many of the arguments that put forth globalization as an inherently modern phenomenon are lacking in
nuance and fail to recognize that trade across communities has occurred for millennia.  “Trade has
always flowed across cultures, civilizations, and states, binding economic fortunes together as well as
acting as a conduit for ideas, technologies, and social practices.”23  While there may be little doubt that
the liberal state is being opened up to business, and that the boundaries to the trade of goods have been
stripped away, this has not occurred in every sector.  There is actually a significant body of literature
which argues that modern trade flows continue to be territorially constrained.  Goldblatt et al. show that
the rise in global trade and investment practices. While significant, these practices have not changed the
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fact that the majority of economic activity still occurs on a more restricted spatial scale.24  Local linkages
for trade still account for the majority of the flow of goods and services.  While the clothes an individual
may purchase could have been sewn in Sri Lanka, packaged in Taiwan, and sold by an American
franchise, the fact is that the person who purchased the items probably bought them in a local store.  That
the garment is the result of an internationalized mode of production is of no immediate relevance.  As a
result, global patterns of production and capital flows, while obviously having profound effects on the
lives of people, are abstract for the individual and do not have to lead to any deterritorialization of
identity.25  
Related to the free movement of goods that has emerged through globalized trade is the
associated notion that the increased mobility of peoples is resulting in a de/territorialization of identity. 
Certainly, there has been a steady increase in the flow of peoples across state borders; the more important
question is who is able to, or allowed to participate in this movement, and who has benefited from this
particular aspect of globalization.  It is the business class that has increased its traffic and movement. 
The “Lonely Planet” audience is the affluent sector of society that comes from the developed North. 
Putting aside the limited manner in which globalization has facilitated the flow of peoples, we can turn to
the other ways in which globalization has been purported to be de/territorializing identity.  Even the
internet, the supposed force of democratization and emancipation, is seldom a tool of liberation.26  It is
expensive to maintain a computer and web-access S especially when significant portions of the globe can
not rely on a steady electrical supply.  Those individuals who are able to reach out into cyberspace to
escape the restraints of borders are extremely limited in number.  There are also initiatives to spatialize
the Net evident in the legal requirements of sites to abide by government controls and in the site
extensions which designate country of origin.27  What we find is that many aspects of territoriality have
in fact been reinforced by the processes of globalization.  Forsberg points out that the internet, and the
increased mobility of peoples has allowed many to choose where to live, thus increasing and not
decreasing territorial attachment.28  Further, he uses the example of the Silicon Valley to illustrate how
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the internet can in fact strengthen local communities.29  The globalized world is not about
de/territorialization of either identity or security.  In essence only acid rain, car parts, and business men
have the ability to flow with ease over the ascribed state boundaries.  The process which Forsberg
observed and which even some strong globalization advocates such as Castells witnessed is that there is
an ongoing reterritorialization of identity.  Unlike Castells I do not feel that the construction of a
particular local identity necessarily contradicts, undermines, or in any way makes a territorialized state
identity irrelevant. 
The connection between globalization and the end of territoriality is quite tenuous.  This
argument can in fact be taken further, while neo-liberal patterns of business may have freed economics
from territorial commitments, for most people the territorial state has, if anything, become more relevant
in the modern world.  I am not arguing that globalization has had no effect on territoriality, rather I am
saying that the de/territorialization of both identity and security that accompanies the processes of
globalization have been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/inscribed territoriality’s relevance
to identity and security.  What this hints at is that the de/territorialization of the state, in both its roles in
identity formation and security, has been followed by a re/territorialization that has re/entrenched the role
of the state.
Homeland Defence
If globalization results in a re/territorialization of the state then the issue of homeland defence must be
considered carefully with regards to how it is a response to these processes.  Homeland defence even the
very title is provocative, conjuring images of a house under siege.  The discourse of homeland defence
has been argued by many in the U.S. defence community to be a relatively new concept that has been
necessitated by the globalized world.  The concept itself did not enter into common usage within the
United States until 1997, though it can be traced to a Presidential Directive issued by Clinton in 1995.30 
Even more recently there have been three major commissions; the Bremer, the Gilmour, and the Hart-
Rudman Commission, all written between 1999 and 2000.31  These three reports reached the same
general conclusion that the American state was vulnerable to attack.  The Hart-Rudman Commission
stated:
America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military
will not entirely protect us… States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons
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35  In part this results from the manner in which ‘threat assessments’ are conducted by intelligence
agencies.  These assessments begin with locating vulnerabilities and then move to identifying which groups might
be capable of such action.  The question of whether the group is likely  to perform  the act is asked  last.
36  This ‘logic’ is clear in the CIA assessment of the threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United States;
the Agency recognizes that capability does not equal willingness, yet they develop their assessment based on this
assumption. “The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction will be used  against US forces or
interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War, and it will continue to grow as the capabilities of
potential adversaries mature.... Although the missiles used in the Gulf war did not have WMD  warheads, Iraq had
weaponized  ballistic missile warheads with BW  and CW  agen ts and they were available for use.”
of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them.  Americans will likely die on
American soil in large numbers.32
Thus as Gerard O’Tuathail stated “A postmodern geopolitical imagination is evident but it still
resides in a world established by the modern geopolitical imagination.  Transnational threats are
specified but layered upon a state-centric and territorially delimited ‘national security’ problematic.” 
The era of state versus state conflict seems to have waned for the authors of these three reports.33  Rather
than focusing on the risk of warfare as we came to understand it in the ‘modern’ era of interstate conflict,
the new warfare will use new tactics with very different characteristics.
The U.S. security establishment, in trying to identify the source of the next threat to America,
was unable to readily identify any states with the capacity to attack and win a war against the West’s
military machine.34  It is quite telling that the threats are perceived as being ‘out there,’ that they are
outside of the American state and are merely awaiting identification.  What the strategic analysts were
able to locate were potentials to do damage to American property and people if those launching an
assault were willing to be hunted down or in the case of a country, annihilated.  Thus the vulnerability of
the state was taken to represent the risk.35  Essentially, if it was possible for a particular analyst to
imagine some horror, then there was a real risk that some organization would attempt to perpetrate that
abomination.  The next step for the analysts was to examine potential capability which was linked up to
vulnerability.  In a simplistic expression of the logic, if a site could be damaged, and if the capability of
doing so was within reach of any given organization, then it is necessary to assume the group would be
willing to take the action.36  Crucially, it must be realized that the security analyst need not concern one’s
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37  I do not wish to imply that this risk of boundary penetration has been a constant discourse, it has in fact
been quite unstable.  
38  The territoriality of the first and second World Wars was dominated by the logic of a field that had to be
progressively invaded.  This logic underpinned both trench warfare and the blitzkrieg.
self with the motivation or intention of the various groups.  This disconnect between capacity and
motivation now bares the official label of an ‘asymmetric threat.’  The term asymmetric threat is used to
refer to situations where a state, weak in a traditional reading of military strength, develops a capability
that off sets its inferior position.  As an example modern computers systems combined with technical
expertise are said to provide states with the ability to harm another country far more than its military
strength would lead one to predict.  With the focus on the capabilities of actors, any attention that was
provided to intentions has faded to the background.  Through this logic rogue states, terrorists, hackers,
drug traders and presumably World Trade Organization protestors, all become identifiable as threats. 
However, in order to see these as threats the notion of what is threatened must also be altered. 
The territorial state, which has in the past been seen as vulnerable at its borders, of being
threatened by invasion, must be re-conceptualized in light of the emerging asymmetric threat.  Security
and strategic studies traditionally relied upon the notion that the state, much like a body, is at risk once
something has the potential to pierce the boundary or skin of the state.  This boundary between
inside/outside is what protects those within from invasion, subversion, infection, and death.  This threat
was normally conceived as being posed by foreign militaries with the numerical or technological might
to push through the boundary.37  The threat has not always come from outside the body, but can often
emerge from within, like a pestilence to infect and destroy the state.  The ‘red’ threat, where anyone
within the state that had affections for Marxist thought, or simply behaved outside of societal norms, is a
textbook example of how America had to be defended from a threat that might be living amongst ‘us’ but
never a part of ‘us.’  
Another security threat that led to de/territorialization and subsequent re/territorialization was the
emergence of the threat of ballistic weapons and long range aircraft capable of delivering weapons of
mass destruction with very little warning.  In the face of such a threat, territoriality as it had been
understood prior to the age of strategic weapons, was of little objective relevance to the state in providing
a context for security.38  Missiles and long-range bombers were able to ignore geographic boundaries,
destroying the protection conferred on a state by its territory.  The development of strategic weapons,
with their purpose of the destruction of the war-fighting capability of a state was the recognition within
military and policy circles that the state as a territorially defined body was losing its centrality to defence
circles.  No longer was the control of territory and the elimination of opposing armies the sole goal of
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39  The discourse screams for a gender analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper.  The role of the man
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militaries, rather the aim came to be the destruction of the industrial capabilities of a state, on its ability
to sustain a military.  The entire state became susceptible to attack, moving the front-line to the
backyards of all of the United States.  This discourse played out in American cinemas during the cold-
war.  The apocalyptic movies of the 1980s that showed young Americans fending off communists in the
backyards of the nation illustrates how the concept of the territorial state had been altered.  A
re/territorialization has taken place that has seen territory remain central to both identity and security, but
through a new articulation of the boundary being everywhere, ground-zero could be next-door.
While the state is no longer an entity that can be defended entirely in the traditional sense of
marching an army to the borders, it has not lost all relevance within the discourse of security.  The state,
as a geographic entity maintains its role as the primary referent of security, it continues to demarcate
what and who is to be protected – who is inside and who is outside a state’s identity.  The stark manner
in which this articulation is done is clear in the adoption of the metaphor of ‘home’ to describe what is to
be protected.  When we talk about a home it is clear that there is a notion of who belongs and who is
excluded.  To carry the metaphor forward, it is understood who is family, who is born into the group,
who are ‘in-laws,’ and thus who are the ‘outlaws.’39  This can in fact be read as a dramatic intensification
of territoriality, it is no longer just the boundary that must be defended, but rather now the entire physical
space of the state; every inch of it is suddenly vulnerable.  It is this logic which is inherent in the
homeland defence discourse.
The historical context of the discussions surrounding homeland defence is extremely important. 
In the mid to late 1990s a number of critical events unfolded that were written as security and defence
threats, as opposed to criminal acts.  The first bombing of the World Trade Centre was proof of the
terrorist threat, and the arrest of Ressam in December 1999, put a racially identifiable face on the threat
and served as proof that there was a concerted effort to attack the U.S..  At the same time the rush to
change over the two digit date to a four digit number was produced as a security threat.  In Canada the
Canadian Forces was deployed according on Operation ABACUS, with weapons, prepared to defend the
country against some ill defined threat.  However, the headlines and military thinking called our attention
to the vulnerability of infrastructure.  The need to defend the networks that drive the Western economy
became a crucial concern.  No longer were the companies who owned the equipment responsible for its
maintenance, it was now the military’s role to defend it.  If attacks could be carried out anywhere within
a state then everthing within the state had to be secured.  Finally, the Oklahoma city bombing provided
further proof of the need to defend the homeland from external threats.  As Matthew Sparke has
demonstrated, the discourse surrounding the event passed quickly from McVeigh and came to focus on
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41  Nathan Hodge, “Port Security Means Heightened Scrutiny of Hazardous Cargoes,” in Defence Week,  
Vol.22, no. 45 (Nov 13, 2001).
42  U.S. Department of State, “Fact Sheet: Action Plan for a Secure U.S.-Canada Border,” 12 Dec. 200,
http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01121203.htm.
the risk that Oklahoma city revealed.40  In fact Sparke argues that the discourse of inside/outside was
ironically strengthened by McVeigh. The acts of McVeigh were used to illustrate the threat of terrorism
in general, a threat that was inevitably assumed to emerge from outside.
Post 9-11 Territoriality
After 11 September, the media was quick to explain how the world had changed dramatically through the
act of terrorism, relating the event, without a sense of irony to Pearl Harbour S a day of infamy for the
globalized world.  These comments were repeated in countless conversations, providing a widely
disseminated discourse which reified the threat and naturalized both the interpretations of the act and the
subsequent Western response.  In particular there was a loss of innocence coming from the violation of
the American territory, and a general acceptance that civil liberties would have to be limited and the state
would have to strive to secure itself from the asymmetric threats wishing to topple the American state.
The extent to which territoriality is still a deeply rooted aspect of security within the West was clear in
the nature of the immediate response of the United States government.  In securing the borders and
shuttering the state behind an armoured wall, the old territorial assumptions were clearly being
reinforced.  While these actions were unprecedented and dramatic there is no proof that this prevented
any further assaults on U.S. territory.  This fortress America, with its drawbridge raised did not, and 
could not last long S after all, like an old walled city that has grown and reached out to its neighbours, it
had long since torn down and made its walls obsolete.  While the percentage of the American economy
that depends on globalized trade is small in comparison to most other countries, the U.S. presents itself
as the epitome of the globalized state.  Thus while the U.S. could perhaps have weathered a contraction
of international trade and a slowing down of imports, this is not what was witnessed.  In fact, since 11
September there has been an apparent acceleration in the drive to speed up the free movement of goods
and to a lesser extent services.  Examples of this include the move to conduct customs checks at sea ports
of origin rather than ports of entry.41  The move along the Canadian/American border is the most telling. 
There are plans now for designated lanes across borders for transport trucks that would facilitate rapid
clearance across the border.42  Discussions have now been launched to pre-clear trucks at factories. 
There are even discussions of accelerating custom checks for business men who frequently transit the
border (presumably this will be dependent on the non-racial profile of the individual).  The 12 December
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2001 Border Security Declaration and the 30 point plan that emerged out of it, aims at establishing a
“smart border” and as Tom Ridge stated “to do everything we can do to eliminate the wait and hassle for
no-risk travelers so we can focus on stopping high-risk individuals.”43
According to the globalization literature, the vanguard of the neo-liberal world order are the
corporate elite.  Surely then we should expect to see a significant reticence, outside of the defence
industry, to a re/territorialization of the state and a increase in defence spending and increased
government penetration into business.  What 11 September has shown is that, in fact, business leaders
are heavily invested in security, without which their businesses can not operate efficiently.44  When the
geographic state, which businesses are still heavily reliant on, is threatened businesses are quite willing
to pay a modest cost to ensure stability.  Following the attacks, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of
major corporations have stepped into the debate around homeland defence, stating clearly that they were
willing to accept higher taxes to provide security, and that they believed borders had to be secured. 
Within Canada the CEOs of Enbridge and Canadian Pacific (CP) have both been quite outspoken in their
support of a North American security perimeter.  For O’Brien, the CEO of CP, “It’s really a matter of
deciding on whose side you’re on.”45  The re/territorialization of the state has ignored international trade. 
Global trade is not central to the new identity and security formations.
The manner in which the U.S. response to terrorism is reliant on identity re/formation is quite
evident in the titles given to the various acts that make up the homeland defence initiatives.   Of greatest
interest is the “USA Patriots Act” which effectively limits immigration, the title of which clearly defines
who does and does not belong to the United States.  It is then effectively delineating in a geographic
manner who is the other.  Americans must be on-guard against all those who live outside of the U.S., as
these aliens are subjected to substantial security checks and are considered threats to America until
proven otherwise.  Dalby and Campbell have both explored at length how this construction of the other is
a necessary component of identity formation. 
Drawing from numerous intellectual sources, the construction of ‘Others’ as enemies allowed the
formulation of the ‘domestic’ identity that was constructed as the antithesis of the external threat
Christie  Homeland Defence and the Re/Territorialization of the State / 17
46  Simon Dalby, referring to David Campbell, p. 298.
to be examined in ways that circumvented the conceptual straitjackets of both structural neo-
realism and techno-strategic discourse46
We must then come back to the role of identity formation and the inscription of who belongs to a
society.  The proclamation of the U.S. that societies were either “with us or against us” provides a stark
articulation of how this binary of inclusion/exclusion operates. 
Canadian Participation in Homeland Defence
Canada has been struggling with these same phenomena, attempting to come to terms with the emerging
security environment and how best to defend the state.  The discourse of American homeland defence is
of central concern to Canadian planners intent on securing the Canadian state.  While homeland defence,
as a concept was slowly gaining credence within the U.S. security establishment, there have been quiet,
but intense, debates within Canada over how to engage the United States on this issue.  Numerous
conferences were organized and consultations were held with experts on terrorism, urban warfare, and
crime.  Notably, a conference organized by Stephane Roussel on Perimeter Defence and Canada was in
hind S sight eerily prescient in identifying the threat of terrorism, yet woefully inadequate in predicting
the nature of the attack.  More importantly, it was expressed at the conference that Canadian cooperation
with the United States was largely pre-ordained, necessitated by the asymmetrical relationship of the two
countries.  The logic of the conference was also quite telling, illustrating the territorialized assumptions
that underpin the mainstream in Canadian and American security studies.  The very term perimeter
defence illustrates the need to keep the alien other outside of the state which is clearly seen in the
argumentation surrounding the need to secure airports. Rather, than representing a demise of the
language of borders, the airports are instead ascribed as the new front line, which simply rearticulates
and reascribes the borderland.  The fact that much of the security literature recognizes that the boundary
is conceptually complicated does not invalidate the point that security remains imbedded within a
territorial discourse.
It is within the context of the American identity construction that we must consider why Canada
is so driven to join in with the homeland defence project.  As with the American debate around homeland
defence, the Canadian debates about whether to join and cooperate with the U.S. predates 11 September
2001.  As mentioned earlier there have been conferences organized within Canada that have dealt with
this specific issue.  In fact the existence of these debates largely set the limits of the post 9-11 debate
within Canada.  The arguments that are put forward that explain why Canada should participate with the
United States in homeland defence can be placed into three general groupings.  These groupings are
intertwined, and most arguments that are put forward touch on two if not all three of the following:
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47 I am not arguing that terrorist cells are non-existent in Canada, nor am I asserting that Canada has not
been a base for planning.  Rather, the evidence clearly illustrates that terrorists are capable of residing within the
United States, and that being abroad , such as in Germany, does not preclude planning and preparing terrorist
attacks.
1. Canada must join out of economic necessity;
2. Canada must join out of strategic necessity; and 
3. the Canadian/U.S. relationship necessitates cooperation.
The lack of empirical evidence supporting the economic argument has already been laid out. 
There is no apparent basis for the argument that a refusal to participate in homeland defence would result
in a significant reduction in the flow of trade across the Canadian/American border.
In contrast to trade, the strategic/security arguments are much more complex and hit a more
visceral nerve.  The creation of the terrorist threat to Canada is quite interesting.  In spite of the apparent
lack of evidence that Canada is being directly targeted by terrorist forces, the fear of such threats is
palpable.  While hardly scientific, casual conversations make it quite clear that Canadians do perceive a
risk.  However, even the initial hysteria that Canada was a base for the terror attacks on the United States
now seems to have been quite overblown.47  However, the event was sufficiently horrendous to strike an
emotive chord, shaking people out of their ambivalence.  It was virtually impossible to achieve distance
from the event.  When the event was written as an attack on democracy, and on the West, it became an
attack on Canadians.  To understand the manner in which this happened — the way in which 9-11
became a security threat for Canada — we must look past the logic of traditional security studies.
What this leaves is the issue of identity, Canadian participation in homeland defence can only be
understood within this context.  The drive to be included in the homeland defence project takes on a very
different light in relation to identity formation.  The extension of the boundary between U.S. and the
threatening other is pushed outward to embrace Canada and the United States.  As politicians and the
media have strived to make clear, we are more than neighbours, we are in some important ways family. 
This language draws us into the American home and ties Canada/Canadians to the security concerns of
the U.S..  Canadian territorialized identity is then reworked to include a North American aspect.  The
continent is not the source of terror, the terror comes to the continent from outside, which in turn
demands a continental response to security concerns.  As politicians and the media have strived to make
clear, Canada and the United States are more than neighbours, we are in fact family.  This language ties
Canadian identity to the United States, and ties our security with American security interests.  Living
beside the U.S. with a nice picket fence is no longer viable under this language, we are rather brought
into a common house, the fence is moved to keep people out.  Canada is then re/territorialized, the
geographic boundaries remain relatively stable, but with the goal of keeping out terrorists and rogue
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agents.  At the same time, the U.S. is re/written as crucial to Canadian security, Canada is expected to
join into homeland defence in order to protect itself from the new post-modern threats.
Contrary to predictions of its demise, the territorialized state remains a central referent for
identity formation.  Globalization has not led to the demise of territoriality and has not had any impact on
its centrality to discourses of security.  This is not to say that the concept has been stable.  The state has
been undergoing a process or de/territorialization and re/territorialization.  The new articulation which
underpins homeland defence is simultaneously distinct from previous understandings of the state, and yet
maintains a connection with the past.  Geography continues to define who belongs to a state and who and
what is to be secured.  So long as territoriality is a defining feature of both identity and security, it will be
virtually impossible to break free of the modes of response to violence that we have come to expect.  At
the same time there, is hope that the incongruities of the discourse of territorialization and homeland
defence, as it applies to Canada, will become apparent, providing space for alternative security postures.
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